Florida Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 2

Article 2

January 1981

Constitutionality Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Section 1983
Damage Remedy
Nicholas Rockwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nicholas Rockwell, Constitutionality Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Section 1983 Damage Remedy,
33 Fla. L. Rev. 168 (1981).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Rockwell: Constitutionality Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Section 1983

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN ZONING:
THE EMERGING SECTION 1983 DAMAGE REMEDY*
NIcHoLAs ROCKWELL

#

INTRODUGTION

Local governments have become increasingly concerned with the impact of
unplanned development on their communities. Although well-intentioned,
their responses to this problem have sometimes been poorly planned, or formulated without regard for the rights of the property owner., Typical abuses include enforcement of an invalid ordinance,2 arbitrary denial of a use permit 3
and rezoning into an unreasonable category.4 As a result, the possibilities for
development of the property have been drastically reduced, often after sub5
stantial investment.
Litigation in which zoning actions are alleged to be unconstitutional has
long been filled with uncertainty and inconsistency.6 The state courts have
developed widely varying views of the status of zoning decisions7 and the appropriate standard of review for the challenge of these decisions. 8 This uncertainty also extends to the remedies available to landowners whose constitutional rights are violated by zoning abuses. 9 Although injunctive relief has long
been available in both state and federal courts for zoning abuses found to be
uncompensated takings or lacking irf substantive due process,' 0 courts have
traditionally been reluctant to award damages for the economic harm suffered
by the landowner. 11 Reluctance to grant damages has been based primarily on
OThis article received the 1979-80 Lawyers' Title Guarantee Fund award as the best
student paper submitted at the University of Florida in the real property area.
"B.A., University of South Florida, 1966; M.A.L.S., University of South Florida, 1976; J.D.,
University of Florida, 1981. Member of the Florida Bar.
1. Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 UPB. LAW.
25, 53 (1973); Durkenminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Yokley, The Place of the Planning Commission and the Board
of Zoning Appeals in Community Life, 8 VAND. L. R.v. 794, 803 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978).
3. See, e.g., Sternaman v. County of McHenry, 454 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. I1. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 790, 553 P.2d 546, 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1976).
6. The wide variation among the states in decisions on the standard of review for zoning
actions has been attributed to the Supreme Court's refusal to hear zoning cases for the period
in which most zoning developed, that between Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). D. MANDELKER, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 216 (1979). For an illustrative list of inconsistent state de-

cisions, see Freilich, New and Significant Zoning Decisions- What Are the Courts Doing in
Zoning?, 1979 INST. PLAN., ZONING,

& EMINENT

DOMAIN 1, 22-23.

7. Status here refers to whether the action is viewed as legislative or quasi-judicial. See
text accompanying notes 34-52 infra.
8. D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 8-16 (1971).
9. Id.
10. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
11. See, e.g., Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260, 267-68 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
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fears that monetary relief would place unreasonable financial burdens on local
governments

2

and on the view that injunctive remedies provide adequate

relief.13
This narrow view of a damage remedy ignores the all or nothing effect of
injunctive remedies and the great potential for economic harm to the landowner even if he is successful in having the zoning action invalidated. 4 Either
the community suffers the invalidation of the ordinance or the property owner
incurs an illegal and uncompensated injury. 5 An effective damage remedy,
however, can allow a balance of interests by retaining the zoning but compensating the owner.' 6 Furthermore, a damage remedy makes it economically
feasible for an owner to vindicate his rights and thereby restrains over-zealous
zoning bodies from illegal actions that formerly might have gone unchallenged.17

The increasing need for damage remedies in zoning litigation has led to the
use of two federal causes of action, a direct action under the fifth8 and four(damages not favored in zoning cases); Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Clara, 415 F. Supp. 1340,
1343 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (plaintiff asking damages in zoning dispute has heavy burden of
proof because of threat to municipal treasury and adequacy of injunctive remedy); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 286, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) (injunctive relief sole
remedy), affd, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
12. Badler, supra note 1,at 52-53.
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (invalid law to be struck rather
than pay compensation for loss); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237,
125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (damages not proper remedy for zoning losses).
14. See Badler, supra note 1, at 25; Staples, Zoning Disasters-Regulatory Overreaching,
1979 INsr. PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DoMAN 149, 166.
15. Badler, supra note 1, at 53. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 388, 389 (1977); McNamara, Inverse Condemnation: A
"Sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog." 31 BAYLOR L. Rv. 443, 444 (1979).
16. Such a balancing approach would be primarily useful in cases involving uncompensated takings. If the zoning action is substantively invalid as arbitrary and capricious or
involves procedural abuses, it may be preferable to have the action declared void and get
damages. The exception might be the case of an invalid single tract rezoning in which the
landowner's project is no longer feasible. In such a case, the community could have its preferred zoning, but would have to compensate the owner for his loss.
17. See Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 887-88 (6th Cir. 1978); Badler, supra
note 1, at 53; Comment, "Takings" Under the Police Power -The Development of Inverse
Condemnationas a Method of ChallengingZoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723, 743-44 (1976).
Gordon involved an apartment building project which was delayed for more than four years
pending a determination that a set back ordinance was invalid as a taking without compensation. In the meantime building costs had of course increased substantially and the project was
badly vandalized. In an era of rapidly rising costs and interest rates, even much shorter delays
may prove financially disastrous to builders committed to strict cost estimates. In the absence
of a damage remedy, local governments may therefore enact invalid ordinances and illegally
but effectively block development to which they are opposed. The developer may simply not
be able to afford to vindicate his constitutional rights. One commentator has advocated a
damage remedy for temporary takings which occur as a result of the enforcement of invalid
ordinances. Staples, supra note 14, at 153-66. While concentrating on the state cases, the author
predicts the emergence of the federal actions discussed in this note. Id. at 163-64.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." The fifth amendment is applicable to the states
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teenth amendments 19 and a damage suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.20 Plaintiffs
have also sought damages under state law using an inverse condemnation
theory.21 These damage complaints may stand alone or be combined with requests for injunctive relief.
After reviewing the basic constitutional standards applicable to zoning
disputes, this article will trace the development of federal constitutional damage actions in land use cases. The article will then discuss the problems and
available defenses in the emerging section 1983 zoning action and examine the
the possibilities for damage awards, including attorney's fees. Finally, an evaluation will be made of the usefulness of the section 1983 damage remedy for
22
plaintiffs challenging local zoning decisions.
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN ZONING ACTIONS

The traditional remedy for abusive zoning ordinances and practices has been
to seek their invalidation by alleging either an uncompensated taking prohibited by the fifth amendment or a violation of substantive due process. 23 A
zoning regulation, while substantively valid, may nonetheless place such a
burden on property as to constitute an invalid taking. 24 The level of governthrough its incorporation in the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 states in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
20. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976): "Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."
21. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1970). See, e.g., City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla.
1954) (damages for improper set back ordinance); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56, 62 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.) (eminent domain proceeding is only remedy for regulatory taking),
cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d
614, 615 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) (inverse condemnation not available for invalid zoning ordinance),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
22. This article deals only with complaints alleging uncompensated takings and deprivations of substantive or procedural due process as a result of local zoning actions. Related areas
such as the abuse of eminent domain, racially discriminatory or exclusive zoning and land use
disputes involving federal or regional authorities are beyond its scope. See, e.g., Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974) (equal protection challenge to ordinance defining single
family use); Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (abuse of condemnation
power), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
23. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407 (1915)
(reduction in value from $800,000 to $60,000 as a result of zoning ordinance not a taking).
24. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). "The mere form of a proceeding instituted against the
owner, even if he be admitted to defend, cannot convert the process used into due process of
law, if the necessary result be to deprive him of his property without compensation." Id. at
236-37. See also Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
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ment interference with the use of property necessary to constitute a taking is
not entirely clear.25r Recent federal cases have based their decisions on the
principle promulgated in a series of Supreme Court cases 26 that the regulation
27
must render the property substantially worthless to be invalid as a taking.
The standard for violation of substantive due process in zoning formulated
by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.28 requires that
the regulation must be "dearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."29 Although
this standard has been widely applied in federal courts, 0 some state courts
found the general welfare concept too vague 3' and upheld regulations if their
reasonableness is "fairly debatable." 32 Thus, substantive challenges to zoning
CALLIEs &c
J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE 238 (1973) (regulations
reasonably related to a public purpose can never constitute a taking).
25. Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 2, 13-14. Compare Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915) (reduction of property value from $800,000 to $60,000 found not a taking) and
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of all economic use of
gravel pit not a taking) with Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938) (restriction of land unsuitable for residential use to residential zoning invalid as a
taking). For a discussion of the theories of police power takings, see Comment, supra note 17,
at 725-28.
26. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
27. E.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1065 (5th Cir. 1975); Steel Hill Dev.,
Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 963 (Ist Cir. 1972); Kent Island Joint Venture v.
Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420
F. Supp. 709, 721-22 (D.N.J. 1976); Pope v. City of Atlanta, 418 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Ga.
1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. Id. at 395.
30. E.g., Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 108 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1973); Steel Hill Dev. Co. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1972); Sternaman v. County of McHenry, 454
F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D.
Md. 1978); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709, 722-23 (D.NJ. 1976).
But see Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980). The Rogin court, citing no
zoning cases, adopted the rational relation test applied by the Supreme Court in equal protection cases involving economic classifications. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-84 (1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). This reasoning ignores the differences between
such cases and zoning disputes as well as the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the arbitrary
and capricious standard in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676
(1976).

Contra, r. BOSSELMAN, D.

31. Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process Before
Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 50, 53 (1974). See, e.g., Consolidated Rock

Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 370 P.2d 342, 347, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643
(1962); Barry v. Town of Glenville, 9 A.D.2d 822, 192 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1959), aff'd on other
grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 1153, 171 N.E.2d 907, 209 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1960). The adoption of the fairly
debatable standard was a result of the courts' frustration in trying to define what it means for
a regulation to be reasonably related to the general welfare and represented almost complete
deference to all but the most outrageous legislative zoning decisions.
32. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). See, e.g., City of
Tempe v. Rasor, 24 Ariz. App. 118, 536 P.2d 239 (1975); Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City,
234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975); Smith v. Board of County Conm'rs, 252 Md. 280, 249 A.2d 708
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ordinances in state courts are subject to varying interpretations of police
power.

33

The existence of procedural due process rights in zoning proceedings is still
problematic in many states and in the federal courts. A threshold issue in deciding if landowners are entitled to procedural safeguards in zoning actions is
whether the proceeding is regarded as legislative, adjudicative or administrativeA4 Legislative decisions are generally subject to judicial review only in terms

3
of arbitrariness, capriciousness and relation to the public welfare. Thus, a
landowner can pragmatically seek review of a zoning decision on procedural
grounds only if the action is classified as quasi-judicial or administrative. The
limited review available of legislative decisions is the result of the presumption
of validity accorded legislative acts by the judicial branch of government.3 6

(1969). In Florida the fairly debatable standard is relevant only to the application of an
ordinance to a specific parcel while the validity of the ordinance itself is measured by its
reasonable relation to the public health safety or general welfare. Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214,
217 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975).
33. Police power is a broad and flexible term for the government's power to regulate
private interests. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain has been stated as follows:
"The distinguishing characteristic between eminent domain and the police power is that the
former involves the taking of property because of the need of the property for the public use,
while the latter involves the regulation of the property to prevent the use thereof in a
In the exercise of eminent domain,
manner that is detrimental to the public interest ....
property or an easement therein is taken from the owner and applied to public use because
the use or enjoyment of such property or easement therein is beneficial to the public. In the
exercise of the police power, the owner is denied the unrestricted use or enjoyment of his
property in the interest of the public welfare." Sackman, The Impact of Zoning and Eminent
Domain Upon Each Other, 1971 INST. PLAN., ZONING & ENINENT DOMAIN 107, 110-111. The
relationship between the two concepts becomes very close in so-called open area zonings. See
Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 211, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1963) (when
property rights are conferred on the public for public use, eminent domain principles apply).
The designation of privately owned land as an "open area" or environmentally sensitive has
elements of both ideas and has been the subject of inverse condemnation actions in federal
courts. In Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the court found that an open area zoning
ordinance was a deliberate attempt by the city to avoid purchasing land it had announced it
would acquire. Finding no relation to the public welfare and no valid rational basis for the
ordinance, the court ordered the city to pay fair market value and the owner to convey fee
title to the city. 401 F. Supp. at 982. This decision was vacated nine months later with the
sole explanation that it was by stipulation and for good cause. 417 F. Supp. at 1126. For a
proposal that open space zoning legislation provide for partial compensation see Comment,
One Tier Beyond Ramapo: Open Space Zoning and the Urban Reserve, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1211 (1978).
34. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 50. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d
Cir. 1980); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837 (1974); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887). But see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 686
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (greatest weight given
to judgment of legislature); Harris, Rezoning-Should It Be a Legislative or Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L. RFv. 409 (1979).
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Local zoning authority is generally divided among the local legislative body
which enacts zoning ordinances and amendments, a planning commission
which makes recommendations to the legislative body on proposed amendments,
and a board of adjustment which hears and decides requests for variances and
s
special exceptions. 37 Under the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and the
39
Standard City Planning Enabling Act adopted by many states, strict procedural safeguards existed only for the actions of local boards of adjustment,
while the procedures of the planning commission and local legislative body
remained largely unrestricted. 40 Amendments to zoning ordinances for single
tract changes were traditionally considered legislative and such individualized
proceedings were therefore cloaked with the same legislative presumption of
41
validity as a comprehensive ordinance regulating the entire municipality.
42
Some states, recognizing the need for procedural reform in rezoning, have
recently designated rezoning proceedings dealing with a specific piece of property as quasi-judicial or administrative and required stricter procedural safeguards. 43

In the federal courts, the quasi-judicial status of the rezoning of specific
tracts remains uncertain. Some federal constitutional zoning decisions have
utilized state law in determining the legislative status of zoning decisions 44 and
37. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 60, 61-62; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 52.
38. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (rev. ed. 1926),
reprintedin 1 R. ANDERsON, AMEmucAN LAw OF ZONING §26.01 (1968).
39. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Aar (rev. ed. 1928).
40. Sullivan, supra note 31, at 51-52.
41. Id.
42. The need for recognition of the quasi-judicial nature of some zoning actions has been
widely noted by commentators. See, e.g., D. MANDEL.EER, supra note 8, at 8-16; Harris, supra
note 36, at 421-25 (advocating judicial status under Texas law); Sullivan, supra note 31, at
50; Comment, The Adjudicative Decision Inherent in Tract Rezoning Requires the Decision
Maker to Adhere to Standards of Minimum Due Process, 8 GA. L. REv. 254, 263 (1973) (referring to the standard of review for procedures as arbitrary and capricious); Comment, Land
Use and Due Process-An Examination of Current Federaland State Procedures,9 ST. MARY's
LJ. 846, 858-59 (1978).
43. See Topanga Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1974); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); West v. City of
Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974). The California Supreme Court has held that
the administrative grant of a variance must be accompanied by administrative findings. When
received by a court these findings must be sustained by substantial evidence. In order to
furnish such findings and reviewable evidence, local zoning ordinances will have to provide
such procedural safeguards as full transcripts, sworn witnesses and cross-examination. See
Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 NJ. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 547, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502
P.2d 327 (1972); Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-judicial
Act: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 Micis. L. REv. 1341, 1341-42 (1975). Specific
procedural steps and the American Law Institutes Model Land Development Code based on
Fasano are discussed at length in Sullivan, supra note 31, at 71-73. But see Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740, rev'd on other grounds, 426
U.S. 668 (1976). For a discussion of state court decisions on the legislative status of zoning
decisions, see Developments in the Law -Zoning, 91 HA.v. L. REv. 1427, 1508-13 (1978).
44. Bruce v. Riddie, 464 F. Supp. 745 (D.S.C. 1979) (relying on South Carolina supreme
court ruling that rezoning is a legislative function).
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in establishing notice requirements in variance hearings. 45 Others have evaluated alleged constitutional violations without reference to state law. In South
Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt16 a three judge panel overturned the denial by
county commissioners of a request for rezoning due to the use of secret, nonrecord evidence which violated standards of minimal due process. The circuit
court found that the case by case evaluation of tract rezoning was quasi-judicial
in nature and thus subject to procedural review. 4 7 On rehearing, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals en banc affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
suit and held that local zoning was legislative in nature, even when applied to
a specific piece of land. A zoning decision was therefore subject to review only
if arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the public welfare. 48 Although the court held that procedural defects did not state a cause of
action, the decision nonetheless examined the alleged abuses and found them
4

without substance.

9

On close examination, the precedents utilized by the Fifth Circuit do not
support its conclusion that tract rezoning is a legislative function. Of the two
cited cases, the first involved the preparation of a comprehensive land use plan
and did not determine the status of a single tract rezoning. 50 The second case
involved a successful substantive challenge to a denial of a variance.51 There,
plaintiffs alleged only that the commission's denial of rezoning was arbitrary
and capricious. Because no procedural violations were alleged, the legislative
or quasi-judicial status of the zoning action was not at issue. The court's statements, relied on by the South Gwinnett Venture court, that the zoning commission was not required to make findings of fact and that its action are entitled to a presumption of validity52 are merely dicta.
Although South Gwinnett Venture is the only federal circuit decision ruling
directly on this issue, subsequent decisions in other circuits have indicated that
violations of minimal procedural due process in zoning state a constitutional
cause of action under section 1983.53 Recognition of procedural due process
45. Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D.Neb. 1976) (defective notice a violation of due
process rights).
46. 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing,491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 419
U.S. 837 (1974).
47. Id. at 391.
48. 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974). Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973), the precedent relied on by the majority en banc, contains language
suggesting that procedural violations might be reviewable. "Plaintiffs do not claim lack of
notice or that the hearing procedures are inadequate. Rather they complain of the frequency
of the hearings .... This type of procedure does not rise to the level of being arbitrary or a
denial of due process." Id. at 748 (emphasis added). South Gwinett Venture was followed in
Stephens v. City of Piano, 375 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (allegation of procedural defects
insufficient to state cause of action).
49. The alleged procedural defect was the use of secret, non-record evidence. 491 F.2d at 7.
50. Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973).
51. Schenk v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 267, 440 F.2d 295 (1967).
52. Id. at 269, 440 F.2d at 297.
53. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980). The court determined that
the ordinance regulating plaintiffs' land applied to all property within a district and thus was
a legislative function. In dicta, the court stated that denial of a variance would be an ad-
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requirements in zoning by federal courts would provide redress for violations
such as a failure to give notice, failure to keep records detailing the evidence
used in decision making, 54 and the failure to allow the presentation of evidence.55 The spectre of federal procedural review would also encourage local
bodies to conduct individual rezoning proceedings in accordance with the due
process standards demanded when the deprivation of property rights is considered. 50 Thus, when procedural violations in zoning proceedings are alleged,
federal courts should determine the adjudicative or legislative nature of the
action based on objective functional standards 7 rather than arbitrary labels or
state law determinations.
The Damage Remedies: Inverse Condemnation UnderState Law
Plaintiffs seeking damages for zoning abuses under state law are limited to
claiming that the regulation is so restrictive as to be a taking or damaging requiring compensation under the federal and state constitutions. 8 The action is
ministrative [quasi-judicial] act requiring procedural safeguards. The court then examined
the Pennsylvania procedures available and found them adequate under the Supreme Court's
standards. For a compilation of due process requirements in proceedings affecting property
interests, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 488-503 (1978). See also
Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 726-27 (D.N.J. 1976); Alessandro v. Village of Peham
Manor, No. 76-1913 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 14, 1978).
54. Sullivan, supra note 31, at 68-71.
55. Id. See also ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §2-304, note, at 92-95 (Proposed
Official Draft 1975). This section proposes procedural safeguards for administrative hearings,
including notice, testimony under oath, presentation of evidence and cross-examination, impartiality, and issuance of written findings.
56. Guidance for the enforcement of procedural due process in zoning actions is available
in analogous areas of the law. Federal courts have examined the procedures utilized by local
governments in many property contexts, such as tax assessment and prejudgment seizures of
property. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F.2d 606, 610 (1st Cir. 1969).
The Di-Chem and Fuentes cases analyze the challenged state laws in terms of minimal constitutional standards based not on state law but on federal concepts of due process. See
Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51

S.

CAL.

L. REv. 355, 376-78 (1978). Suggested due process standards for zoning are also de-

veloped in Developments in the Law- Zoning, supra note 43, at 1524-28.

57. A functional analysis would focus on whether the zoning action classified the property
of an area or district and so was legislative, or whether the decision affected the rights of a
landowner in a specific piece of property. The latter would be quasi-judicial despite its
formal designation as an amendment to an ordinance, since it decided the rights of a single
landowner. Several state courts have rejected this view explicitly. E.g., City of Coral Gables
v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.) (zoning amendment affecting only one piece of
property a legislative act), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Denney v. City of Duluth,
295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972); Lawton v. City of Austin, 404 S.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
58. Those few states that do not have a specific provision for just compensation have
judicially read one into their constitutions, 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHots' TBE LAw OF EsmxEr
DOMAiN §1.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1979). Approximately one half the states have constitutional provisions providing that due compensation be paid when property is either "taken" or "damages." 2A J. SACKaAN, supra, §6.44 (rev. 3d ed. 1979). Generally mere diminution in value is
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described as inverse condemnation because, instead of the government condemning property prior to acquiring it, the landowner initiates proceedings to
force compensation for a confiscatory regulation. 59 The increased use of this
60
theory in state courts has provoked mixed reactions from both commentators
61
and the courts, resulting in uncertainty as to its future utility. The California
Supreme Court recently held that inverse condemnation is unavailable as a
remedy for confiscatory zoning ordinances.62 Although the United States
Supreme Court upheld the decision, it did not specifically reach the issue of the
availability of damages in inverse condemnation cases. 63 Further uncertainty as
to the availability of inverse condemnation exists because the action arises from
a constitutional prohibition and generally has no explicit statutory basis, leaving its existence as a cause of action up to the discretion of the courts.

64

In

not regarded as sufficient damage to invoke the prohibition. A physical invasion of the property is usually required. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. Rxv. 779, 783 (1976) (proposing that the
standard for "damaging" under the California constitution be based solely on diminution in
value as opposed to present standard generally requiring physical invasion). With regard to the
application of the "taking or damaging" provision to zoning, one commentator has noted that
the state decisions are "characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained
in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, supra
note 21, at 1-2. For a summary of state court views allowing inverse condemnation, see
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979).
59. Comment, supra note 17, at 724.
60. An extended examination of state inverse condemnation cases is beyond the scope of
this article. However, inverse condemnation has been praised as a long needed relief for injured property owners. Badler, supra note 1, at 53; Comment, supra note 17, at 735. Nevertheless, it has been criticized as a threat to municipal treasuries and freedom of action. Comment,
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974); Comment, Limiting the Availability of Inverse Condemnation as a
Landowner's Remedy for Downzoning, 13 Ua,. L. ANN. 263 (1977).
61. CompareAgins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 2d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979)
(inverse condemnation not available as a remedy for confiscatory zoning ordinance), afJ'd, 100
S. Ct. 2138 (1980) and Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1973) (inverse condemnation not available when zoning ordinance is invalid), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) with Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77
Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) and City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (damages proper
for actions under set back ordinance amounting to a taking) and Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of
Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968) (one year freeze statute implies compensation to
be paid).
62. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd,
100 S.Ct. 2138 (1980). The defendant city had rezoned plaintiff's valuable residential property
limiting it to not more than one dwelling unit per acre, and possibly as few as one unit for
the entire five acre parcel. The court held not only that the restriction was insufficient to
constitute a taking, but that on policy grounds, even if it were considered a taking, invalidation would be the sole remedy available. The court characterized inverse condemnation as
"yet another threat to legislative control over appropriate land-use determination." Id. at 276,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 598 P.2d at 30.
63. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980). The Supreme Court did not reach
the question of whether a state could constitutionally deny a damage remedy in inverse condemnation to landowners whose property has been effectively taken by regulation. Instead the
Court determined that no taking was present in this case and thus resolution of the constitutional issue was unnecessary. Id. at 2142.
64. Under similar facts and constitutional taking provisions the state courts have reached
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addition to this legal uncertainty, inverse condemnation requires that the abuse
amount to a taking.65 Consequential damages resulting from procedural abuses
or substantively invalid actions which do not constitute a taking are generally
not compensable. 6
Emergence of the Section 1983 Damage Remedy
As a result of the uncertainty surrounding inverse condemnation in the state
courts, many plaintiffs have turned to the federal courts for relief from zoning
abuses. Although federal injunctive relief against local governments for constitutional violations in zoning has traditionally been available6 under the
fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. §1331,68 prior to 1971, damages from
municipalities generally were not obtainable.69 Moreover, section 1331 requires pleading a $10,000 jurisdictional amount. While Congress had provided
a statutory damage remedy for constitutional violations in 42 U.S.C. §1983,70
the Supreme Court held in 1961 that municipalities were not "persons" liable
for such injuries. 71 Plaintiffs utilizing section 1983 were therefore required to sue
the municipal officials, a difficult proposition both in terms of immunities and
the source of the damages.7 2 Effectively barred from suing the municipality
contradictory conclusions. Compare City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978)
(compensation required) with Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614, 615
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973) (no inverse condemnation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 706, 594 P.2d 671,
678 (1979) (requirement for a taking satisfied by refusal to issue plat in contemplation of
future highway construction).
66. See, e.g., Arnold v. Prince George's County, 270 Md. 285, 294, 311 A.2d 223, 228 (1973)
(consequential damages not compensable in inverse condemnation).
67. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §2.03 (4th ed. 1979).
68. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1976): "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United
States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs,
the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff."
69. The lack of a federal damage remedy in spite of §1983 was due to a combination of
two factors, the immunity of prospective defendants and the unprotected status of property
rights under §1983.
70. See note 20 supra.
71. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
72. Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw.
U.L. Ray. 770 (1975). In many cases damage suits for zoning abuses are economically worthwhile only if payment may be had from the municipal treasury. When the municipality was
immune, plaintiffs were also barred from reaching the municipal treasury under respondeat
superior by suing the public officials in their official capacities. See Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d

1158 (9th Cir. 1976); Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260, 267 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935, 941 (D. Md. 1977). Even if the officials' personal
finances made suing them in their individual capacities worthwhile, they were likely to be
shielded from personal liability by absolute or qualified immunities. If the alleged abuse was
viewed as legislative, the officials often enjoyed absolute immunity from suit. See Kent Island
Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 458-59 (D. Md. 1978); Ligon v. Maryland, 448
F. Supp. 935, 940-41 (D. Md. 1977); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237,
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under section 1983, these plaintiffs developed an alternate cause of action based
directly on the constitutional provision allegedly violated. This cause of action
was first established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 73 therefore it is
often termed a Bivens or direct constitutional action. In Bivens, the Supreme
Court held federal officers liable in damages for search and seizure violations
of the fourth amendment.7 4 In a broad holding, the Court determined that
damages are an appropriate remedy for constitutional violations when the
jurisdictional requirements of section 133175 are met. The remedy arises directly from the existence of the constitutional right.76

Until 1978 the Bivens action remained the principal remedy for deprivation
of constitutional rights by local governments. The application of the Bivens
action to other constitutional issues, 7 7 including zoning disputes, and to mu-

nicipalities as defendants78 has been used with mixed success. Although a ma7
jority of the courts considering the issue have endorsed this cause of action, its
use against municipalities has not been explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court.
More recently, section 1983 has emerged as the preferred basis for damages
in zoning disputes. The usefulness of the Bivens action was substantially un241-42 (D. Del. 1968) (legislative immunity extends to local as well as state legislators). Even
when the officials were found to be acting in an administrative capacity, they enjoyed a
qualified good faith immunity requiring a showing of malice or wrongful motive for liability.
See Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260, 267 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Kinderhill
Farm Breeding Assocs. v. Apfel, 450 F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Adler v. Lynch, 415
F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Neb. 1976); M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354,
360 (N.D. Cal. 1975). It is therefore greatly to the plaintiff's advantage to be able to sue the
local government itself rather than to sue the responsible officials.
73. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens is analyzed at length in Delliger, Of Rights and Remedies:
The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1558-59 (1972), which briefly compares
the availability of §1983 damage suits with the Bivens action. For pre-Bivens commentary on
municipal liability for constitutional violations, compare Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1155-58 (1969) (favoring a damage remedy) with Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Yake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1506 (1969) (disapproving municipal liability).
74. 403 U.S. at 397.
75. See note 68 supra.
76. 403 U.S. at 396.
77. The application of the Bivens action to municipalities for other constitutional violations, e.g., search and seizure, equal protection, and employment rights, is discussed in Hundt,
supra note 72.
78. The extension of the Bivens action to other constitutional rights and to municipalities
as defendants was first suggested in a concurring opinion by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., concurring)
(§1983 not available against municipalities for injunctive relief).
79. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1978); Jacobsen v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1977); Brault v. Town of
Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1975); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420
F. Supp. 109, 715 (D.N.J. 1976); Rassmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 398
F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Md. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
But see Farnsworth v. Orem City, 421 F. Supp. 830 (C.D. Utah 1976); Perzanowski v. Salvio,
369 F. Supp. 223, 228-30 (D. Conn. 1974).
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dermined in 1978 by the Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social
Services.80 In Monell, female employees of New York City sued under section
1983 seeking back pay for mandatory but medically unnecessary unpaid leave
during pregnancy. The Court re-examined the legislative history of section
1983, overruled its earlier decision in Monroe v. PapeSl and held that the city
was a "person" within the scope of section 1983.2 Accordingly, local governments can be sued under section 1983 for damages where "the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers." 83
Since Monell some courts have held that the Bivens action is unavailable
when section 1983 can be used instead8 4 Other reasons for preferring section
1983 to the Bivens action are the lack of a jurisdictional amount 5 and a
firmly established statutory basis which has the compensation of constitutional
injuries as its express purpose. One advantage of the Bivens action is that
Monell specifically excluded respondeat superior actions from section 1983
coverage through its "official policy" language.8 6 Although this difference may
80. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Comment, Municipalities and Local Governments
Are "Persons" Under Section 1983 and Are Liable For Constitutional Deprivations Resulting
From Governmental Policy or Custom, 47 U. CiN. L. Rxv. 670 (1978); Comment, Discarding
Section 1983 MunicipalImmunity - Is That Enough?, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 979 (1978).

81. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (municipalities are not "persons" within meaning of §1983 and
therefore are immune from suit under that section).
82. 436 U.S. at 690.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980); Turpin v. Mallet,
591 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1979) (direct action not available when statutory remedy may be
used); Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978) (criticized in Comment, Judicial
Refusal to Imply a Cause of Action Against Municipality Under Fourteenth Amendment After
Monell, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1150 (1979));Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652,
677-78 (E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 97-98 (5th Cir.)
(court had jurisdiction under both Civil Rights Act and §1331), modified, 595 F.2d 1119 (5th
Cir. 1979); T & M Homes v. Township of Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 505-06, 393 A.2d 613,
617 (Law Div. 1978) (Bivens action available until Supreme Court rules otherwise).
85. Section 1983 has its jurisdictional base in 28 U.S.C. §1343, which unlike §1381 (used
with the Bivens action) does not require pleading of an amount in controversy in excess of
$10,000. Section 1343 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (I) To recover damages for
injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in
section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to
aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge
were about to occur and power to prevent; (8) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) To
recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing
for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. §1343 (1976). In
addition, action under §1983 has the advantage of being less prone to abstention problems.
See text accompanying notes 137-139 infra.
86. 408 U.S. at 388.
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make the Bivens action preferrable for use with such problems as police
brutality, it has little application in the zoning area where the contested actions
are almost invariably part of an ordinance or official proceedings. 7 The constitutional rights involved in zoning disputes under both causes of action are
identical and plaintiffs have commonly pleaded them in the alternative1 8 Since
the United States Supreme Court has recently held that land use regulation
amounting to a taking states a cause of action under section 1983,9 the section
1983 action seems likely to predominate in future zoning suits. Once an injured landowner has decided to pursue a damage suit under section 1983 based
on one of the theories presented above, he is likely to encounter any of several
preliminary challenges to his action before the court considers the actual merits
of his claim.90
PROBLEMS IN SECTION 1983 ZONING ACTIONS

ProtectedPropertyRights
Prior to 1972, section 1983 protected only "personal" rights as opposed to
"property" rights. 91 Zoning cases alleging civil rights violations were therefore
likely to be dismissed as outside the ambit of section 1983. 9 2 In 1972, however,
the Court explicitly rejected this distinction and held that property rights were
protected civil rights under section 1983. 93 Consequently, the lower federal
courts have recognized the application of section 1983 to unconstitutional
94
deprivations of property rights in zoning disputes.
87. The official policy requirement may present difficulties when the abuses leading to the
loss can be considered as outside the official's duties and of a personal nature, such as
clandestine agreements with local interest groups, or accepting pay-offs for zoning decisions.
Plaintiffs in such situations have alleged conspiracies to deny equal protection under 42 U.S.C.
§1985(3) (1976). These suits have generally been dismissed under the Supreme Court's ruling
in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), requiring that there be some racial or
otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory intent in the denial of equal protection. See,
e.g., Ligon v. Maryland, 448 F. Supp. 935, 941 (D. Md. 1977).
88. E.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976);
Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974); Brosten v. Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608
(N.D. Ill. 1973); Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp. 947 (D.N.H. 1971).
89. Lake Country Estates, Inv. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399
(1979). The Supreme Court's opinion dealt primarily with the immunities of agency officials,
but in passing approved the use of the §1983 cause of action in the area of land use control.
Id. at 399.
90. Prior to Monell, the §1983 action was usually dismissed because the city was not a
"person" for §1983 purposes under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For this reason the
potential difficulties of such suits must be evaluated using cases brought as Bivens actions.
91. E.g., Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1971); Ream v. Handley,
359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966); Snider v. Winstead, 339 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Va. 1972).
92. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140
(4th Cir. 1971).
93. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972) (reversing dismissal of claim
against a prejudgment attachment statute).
94. See, e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J.
1976); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 398
F. Supp. 21, 23 (D. Md. 1975); Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Pa.
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Defining Constitutionally Protected Property Rights
Exactly what constitutes a protected property right within the context of
section 1983 is less clear.95 The definition of constitutionally protected property
rights becomes crucial when a lack of due process is alleged because the
guarantee of due process applies only to the deprivation of life, liberty and
property.96 Thus, if the interest affected by a procedurally inadequate action
is not considered a property right, no redress is available under section 1983.97
Unlike the right of freedom of speech and the right to compensation for a
taking of property for public use, which are directly guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights and have been defined under federal law,98 other property rights have
traditionally been defined by reference to state law.9 9 Thus, when plaintiffs
allege a deprivation of a property interest which does not amount to a taking,
federal courts are likely to refer to state law to determine if the interest is a
right meriting constitutional protection.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this approach in Ellentuck
v. Klein.00 Plaintiffs alleged the improper granting of a variance to a neighboring landowner violated their constitutional rights. Dismissing the claim for
failure to state a cause of action, the court relied on a New York state law that
denied a vested interest to a property owner in the existing classification of his
or his neighbor's property.1 01 An Oregon federal district court recently ab1974). But see Walsh v. City of Long Beach, 379 F. Supp. 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (relying on
pre-1970 cases).
95. Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State of Mind
Requirement, 46 U. CIN.L. REv.45, 66 (1977). See generally B. AcKERmAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-67 (1977).
96. US. CONSr. amend. XIV. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668, 680 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). See Note, Statutory Entitlement
and the Concept of Property, 86 YALEa L.J. 695 (1977).
98. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 COmELL L. REV. 445,451 (1977).

99. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (no protected property interest in continued
employment under state defined procedure); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (reputation not a protected liberty interest since not protected by state law); Muhlker v. Harlem R.R.,
1.97 U.S. 544, 564 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (statutory entitlement to employment); Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944). Muhlker is of
particular interest in the zoning field since it involved the definition of light and air easements
under New York law. See also Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REy.
405, 435 (1977); P. BATOR, P. MxSHKm, D. SHAPIRE & H. WEcmLER, HART & WEcSLm's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 500-502 (2d ed. 1973). Contrast the views expressed

in Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood with United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373
(1945), that property "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it ....The constitutional provision
is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may prossess." Id. at 377-78. Discussion of the
choice of law in determining property rights has also arisen in connection with federal condemnation proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962)
(practical considerations favor use of state law).
100. 570 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1978).
10I. Id. at 429-30 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). A similar approach was recently taken by the Fourth Circuit
in United Land Corp. of America v. Clarke, 613 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff alleged that
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stained 0 2 from considering a landowner's complaint concerning a zoning
ordinance which decreased the allowable building density on his property by
a factor of ten on similar grounds. 0 3 The court reasoned that because state law
defined the property interest involved, it should also determine whether and
04
to what extent due process rights exist.
While state determination of whether due process rights attach is based on
long standing authority, the conclusion that state law will also specify what due
process rights are available reflects a new concept of due process first pro10 5
pounded by Justice Rehnquist in 1974. In Arnett v. Kennedy, Justice Rehnquist advanced the principle that state law, in creating property rights, in10 6
cludes in that definition the procedures available to terminate the interest.
While this theory may be defensible in the statutory entitlement cases dealing
with property interests such as welfare payments or job security, it is inconsistent with both precedent and the continued viability of federal constitutional
safeguards when applied to traditional common law property interests such as
the possession of chattels or the use of real property. Certainly nowhere in the
Supreme Court's prejudgment seizure of property cases' 07 is there any suggestion
that because state law defines the ownership of chattels the state can deprive
the owner of possession without adhering to the minimal due process standards
defined by federal law. Thus, in zoning disputes while state law may determine
the status of the zoning proceeding and the property interest involved, the procedures involved in regulation of constitutionally protected rights in quasijudicial proceedings should meet federal due process standards.
The dismissal of a federal zoning action because the court ostensibly finds
the alleged property interest not to be constitutionally protected often seems to
08
be based on the court's impression that the suit is frivolous' or the court's
09
At the other extreme is
desire to not be involved in a zoning dispute.
0
built using a building
pool
a
swimming
involved
which
Smith"
v.
Minshew
its substantive due process rights were violated by the defendant's unlawful failure to grant a
soil erosion permit. The court held that since plaintiffs were not entitled to the permit under
state law or county ordinance, no protected property right was at stake.
102. Abstention is discussed at greater length in text accompanying notes 125-145 infra.
103. Webber v. Skoko, 432 F. Supp. 810 (D. Or. 1977).
104. Id. at 813.
105. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
106. Id. at 153-54. The reasoning of Arnett is criticized at length in Van Alstyne, supra
note 98, at 460-66. See also Monaghan, supra note 99, at 438-39.
107. See cases cited in note 56 supra.
108. E.g., Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, 565 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1977) (the
court found that no vested development right existed and termed the suit "so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit").
109. Studen v. Beebe, 588 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1978). The court held plaintiffs' allegation of
due process violations in a rezoning procedure which substantially reduced the value of their
land was not a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and was rather within the
jurisdiction of state courts. Id. at 566. Accord, Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,

338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H. 1972). Increase in minimum lot size from less than one acre to three
to six acres did not "deprive the plaintiff of any rights guaranteed under the United States
Constitution." Id. at 308.
110. 380 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
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permit issued in violation of a local zoning ordinance. There was no discussion
of the property right invaded or its constitutional status. However, the court
awarded damages for violations of property rights caused by the lights and
noise of the neighboring pool.1 These opinions reflect the wide variation in
courts' attitudes toward problems of federalism and the expansion of federal
jurisdiction.
Vesting
The problems inherent in a state law determination of property rights
emerge most dearly in controversies involving the question of when the right
to develop property becomes vested. If federal courts refer to state law to define
protected property rights, the right to develop land may be viewed as constitutionally protected only when it has vested under state law. To establish a right
to redress for constitutional violations under section 1983, the landowner whose
development has been cancelled or interrupted by a zoning change may have to
show that his development right has vested under state law.11 2 Such a showing
may also provide the basis for a state law action for injunctive relief under an
equitable estoppel theory.1"3 California has developed a general vesting rule
which states that the development right vests when the property owner has
performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in a good faith
reliance on his building permit.1 4 Florida's rule is somewhat more liberal in
that it requires only a substantial change in position and not the physical start
of construction15
One difficulty with such rules is that most large construction projects require several permits which often must be obtained sequentially.116 In general,
states may differ significantly concerning the point at which vesting occurs."17
The time of vesting may also be influenced by state rules concerning what is
considered a substantial expenditure.11 8 Given these widely varying state law
111. Id.at 929.
112. See, e.g., Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 224 A.2d 250, 254 (Del. 1968); Parkway Bank &
Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 43 Ill. App. 3d 400, 357 N.E.2d 211 (1976) (property right not

vested under state law is not protected under U.S. Constitution).
113. See, e.g., City of Naples v. Crans, 292 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
114. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 889 (1976).
115. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976). See
generally Rhodes, Haigler & Brown, Land Use Controls, 31 U. MILmi L. REv. 1083, 1098-99
(1977); Rhodes, These Rights Are Mine: Downzoning, Vested Rights and Equitable Estoppel,
50 FLA. BJ. 586 (1976).
116. Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development Vis a Vis the Abor-

tions of Public Whimsy, 7 ENvr'L L. 519, 521-22 (1977). Professor Hagman's thesis is that thie
current California vesting rule vests the right at so late a stage in the progress of the development as to cause unnecessary waste by interruptions, modifications, etc. He proposes an early
vesting rule be adopted by state statute.

117. Id.
118. Compare Nott v. Wolff, 18 11. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1960) (balancing public
gain against builder's loss) with Melino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super 195, 281 A.2d
401 (Law Div. 1971) (investment of $51,000 insufficient since only 2% of total cost). The courts

will also consider how closely pre-construction activities are related to the particular use in
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approaches to vesting, the inevitable result of federal courts' reliance on state
determinations of protected property rights will be conflicting federal decisions
in zoning disputes having essentially similar facts.
Other Standards For Defining Protected Property Interests
Application of a federal standard for protected property rights would lead
to greater consistency in this rapidly expanding area of federal litigation.
Commentary regarding employment entitlement cases has suggested that there
may be a minimum federal constitutional content for property rights independent of state law determinations. 119 One such view proposes that although
state law determines the existence of the interest, its characterization as con2
stitutionally protected property should be a matter of federal interpretation.1 0
Applying this theory to zoning actions, state law would define the existence of a
zoning classification, but the classification's status as constitutionally protected
property, not to be affected without due process, would be determined by an
2
independent federal evaluation.1 1
Determination of property rights independent of state vesting rules is supported by a significant difference between the vesting cases and section 1983
zoning actions. The vesting cases often involve the developer's rights in the face
question. See, e.g., Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
Still another point of difference between the states is whether the development right vests on
issuance of the permit or after construction begins. Compare Gallagher v. Building Inspector,
432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968) (development rights vest on issuance at a valid permit if no
prohibitory ordinance pending) with Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Manganiello, 30 Misc. 2d
117, 213 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (construction must begin before vesting occurs). The
California supreme court held in Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), that the issuance of a grading
permit and preliminary development approval followed by substantial construction was insufficient to vest rights to complete the project absent building permits for the particular
structures. See also Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953)
(builder's rights not vested until lapse of appeal period after issuance of permit). These and
other related problems of the state vesting decisions are discussed in detail in Cunningham &
Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625
(1978); Delaney 8: Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in
Land Development, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 219 (1979).
119. Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section
1983, 51 S. CAL. L. Rav. 355 (1978); Monaghan, supra note 99, at 435-36. The limitation of
state law determination as opposed to minimal federal guarantees in property can be seen in
the doctrine's logical extension. Suppose, for instance, that a state were to change fundamental
rights in a fee interest, perhaps to eliminate devise of realty. Would not such legislation be a
deprivation of a property right without due process? For other hypothetical situations which
might invoke minimum federal property content, see Glennon, supra, at 375. See also Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stephens, J., concurring).
120. Monaghan, supra note 99, at 435-36. An analogous area of conflict between state and
federal characterizations of property is tax litigation. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932). In tax matters, the federal government has a strong financial interest in
making its own determination of the status established by state law.
121. For a suggested analysis of protected property rights in zoning based on the expectations of the landowner and economic effects of zoning see Developments in the Law - Zoning,
supra note 43, at 1513-23.
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of validly enacted legislation which is being challenged only on the basis of the
developer's reasonable reliance on his right to develop the property.12 2 By
contrast, a section 1983 damage action would be premised on the substantive or
procedural invalidity of the regulation limiting use of the land and should
protect interests which might legitimately be affected by valid legislation.
Because the vesting cases often decide whether a landowner's interest can be
affected by valid legislation, the protected status of the interest is likely to be
rigorously scrutinized.
Property interests affected by invalid legislation might not meet such a
standard and yet still be entitled to constitutional protection. Under such a
view, different standards could be applied to determine the protected status of
property interests affected by invalid zoning actions from those applied to
determine interests affected by valid regulations as in the vesting cases. Thus,

state vesting doctrines are not necessarily the proper standard for determining
the protected status of property interests affected by invalid zoning action.
Nonetheless, in view of the trend in recent Supreme Court cases, 1 23 the sensitive
nature of zoning problems, and the reluctance of many federal courts to interfere in what they regard as exclusively local concerns, 12 4 section 1983 zoning
actions are likely to continue to meet challenges based on state law definition
of the protected status of property rights in land use regulation.
Abstention
Another common preliminary challenge to section 1983 zoning actions is

the doctrine of abstention, which actually encompasses three distinct but interrelated theories.12 5 Two of these have been applied to section 1983 zoning
actions. The first states that even when a district court has jurisdiction over a
matter, it may stay the action if resolution of an unclear state law may render
the federal question moot. 26 The second theory, a corollary of the first, states
122. See, e.g.,-City of Naples v. Crans, 292 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974); City of Boynton
Beach v. Carroll, 272 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979); Osina v. City of Chicago, 28 Ill. App.
3d 955, 329 N.E.2d 498 (1975); Excellent Builders, Inc. v. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank, 15 Ill.
App. 3d 832, 305 N.E.2d 273 (1973); Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786

(1976).
123.

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Arnett v.

Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See text accompanying notes 96-107 supra.
124. See, e.g., Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Md. 1978);
Williams v. Patton, 410 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Brosten v. Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608,
613-14 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1974).
125. These theories are often referred to by the names of the Supreme Court cases in
which they were developed. The two theories applicable in the zoning context appeared in
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 US. 496 (1941) (consideration of alleged unconstitutional discrimination deferred pending resolution of unclear state law), and Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (suit to enjoin order of State Railroad Commission concerning
oil wells dismissed as interfering with comprehensive state regulatory system). The third theory
is exemplified by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and concerns injunctive relief against
pending state criminal proceedings.
126. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); IA J. MooRE, FDMa.L
PRAcricE f[0.20311] (1980); C. WwRGHT, LAw or FozstAz. CouaRs §52 (2d ed. 1970).
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that if the federal action would substantially interfere with a unified state
regulatory scheme the action should be dismissed. 127
In section 1983 zoning cases, the abstention decision should depend on
whether the constitutional issue is based on a zoning ordinance or enabling
statute which may be construed by the state court so as to render the federal
action unnecessary, and whether a decision by a federal court regarding the
disputed zoning action would substantially interfere with a complex land use
regulatory scheme. Typical of decisions to abstain is Rancho Palos Verdes
Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach128 in which a developer charged that city officials had conspired to deprive it of the use of its property through a building
moratorium and an open space amendment to the city zoning plan.

29

The

federal district court found that the validity of the officials' actions depended
on the state's uninterpreted and complex land use control statutes and that
clarification of those statutes might eliminate the federal question. 130 Emphasizing the sensitive nature of state land use controls, the court abstained,
although it retained jurisdiction pending resolution of the state law issues.'3'
Actions brought against regional or state-wide planning agencies are very
likely to be dismissed based on the abstention doctrine. In Beck v. State of
California,32 a landowner sued the state and the California Coastal Commission
for denying him a building permit in a sensitive coastal area subject to comprehensive regulation by the Commission. The federal district court found the
case appropriate for abstention both because further state proceedings might
obviate the need to reach a federal question and because of the potential impact
33
on the state's regulatory scheme.
In contrast, the federal district court in Lerner v. Town of Islip1 34 declined

to abstain from considering whether a local zoning ordinance limiting lot size
constituted a taking as applied to the plaintiff's property. Noting the fragmented nature of local zoning schemes, the court held that because the federal
question was not dependent on any unresolved state law issue, abstention
would be inappropriate. 3 5
These decisions illustrate the sound application of the abstention doctrines
promulgated by the Supreme Court. Other federal courts, however, have based
their abstention decisions on less relevant factors. In particular, the individual
judge's view of the relationship between federal and state courts has often been
more influential in the decisions than application of stated legal principles.36
127. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); IA J. MooRE, supra note 126, at
ff.203[l].
128. 390 F. Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1975), afj'd, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 1005.
130. Id. at 1006.
131. Id.
132. 479 F. Supp. 392 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
133. Id. at 398-400.
134. 272 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
135. Id. at 667-68.
136. See, e.g., Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Md. 1978).
Plaintiffs alleged that a local water and sewer classification and other acts of county officials
were unreasonable and deprived them of property without compensation. Although no state
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Abstention is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the exercise of a
federal court's jurisdiction"' which is especially disfavored in dvil rights
cases.' 35 The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts may not channel
federal constitutional issues into state courts merely to avoid a federal decision. 89 Further, abstention causes delay in the resolution of litigation by
referring to the state courts claims which are likely to return for later federal
consideration of the original constitutional issues. 40 The prolonging of litigation by such fragmentation also results in greatly increased costs,14 1 both to the

litigants and the courts. Thus, section 1983 zoning claims alleging abuses resulting from unambiguous practices or ordinances which are not part of a
4 2
complex state-wide regulatory system should not be subject to abstention.
The possibility of abstention has also arisen when the state constitution has
a provision prohibiting uncompensated takings which substantially mirrors the
federal constitution.1 43 The United States Supreme Court has rejected abstention in such cases, reasoning that to abstain in these circumstances would
effectively eliminate federal jurisdiction of many constitutional questions.-4

wide regulatory scheme was involved and plaintiffs alleged that the local ordinance was
arbitrary and capricious, the court depended on a "mixture" of Pullman and Burford doctrines to justify its abstention. Id. at 462. The court's actual reason for its decision is revealed
in a later passage in which, after detailing a classic substantive due process objection to a
zoning ordinance, the court noted that the claim could be brought in state court, and the
federal court would therefore not intervene. Besides ignoring the disparity between the state
injunctive remedy and the damages claimed in the federal suit, this reasoning, if extended,
would apply to every federal cause of action having a state counterpart. See also Williams v.
Patton, 410 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Brosten v. Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608, 614 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
137. Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
138. Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 1974); Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967).
139. Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
140. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
The plaintiffs in England originally brought suit under the fourteenth amendment in federal
district court. After the district court abstained, they litigated both state law and federal constitutional issues in state court and were eventually denied review by the state supreme court.
They then returned to the federal district court where their federal suit was dismissed on the
ground that they should have appealed the state decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. On
appeal from dismissal in the district court, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
federal district court for consideration of their original constitutional claim.
141. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
142. Santa Fe Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 1979);
Webber v. Skoko, 432 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (D. Or. 1977). For an argument against any application of abstention in inverse condemnation actions see Harris, Application of the Abstention
Doctrine to Inverse Condemnation Actions in Federal Court, 4 PEPPXDINE L. REv. 1 (1977).
143. See note 58 and accompanying text, supra.
144. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971). The majority of lower courts have
followed this rationale. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148, 153 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); M.J. Brock &Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Donohoe
Constr. Co. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 398 F. Supp. 21, 25-26 (D.

Md. 1975).
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Nonetheless, some courts continue to hold that the availability of an identical
145
state remedy is grounds for abstention.
In addition to its use in abstention, the availability of state remedies is
sometimes raised as a separate bar to federal jurisdiction in section 1983 zoning
actions.148 Although it is settled law that section 1983 is fully supplementary to
state judicial remedies 147 and exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a
prerequisite for section 1983 relief,1 48 the necessity of exhausting state administrative remedies is still being questioned. While the Supreme Court has held
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary, 49 some lower courts
deciding federal zoning cases have required at least a discussion of the doctrine.
These courts have then examined the factual situation and evaluated the utility
of insisting that the administrative remedy be exhausted.9 0 Where defendants
have been unable to show affirmatively that available administrative procedures
have not been exhausted' 51 or where plaintiffs can make a preliminary showing
that resort to the administrative procedure would have been futile or the relief
inadequate, 15 2 courts have refused to dismiss the complaints. 153 Conversely,
plaintiffs who ignore all available state administrative remedies face the possibility of dismissal in federal court. 154 The extension of section 1983 to include
municipal liability in damages means that an even wider gap now exists between available state remedies and section 1983 relief. Thus, plaintiffs who have
suffered damages not compensable under state law should have little difficulty
145. Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 1978); Newport Invs., Inc.
v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1977). The "mirror" doctrine raised in
this case is contra to the Ninth Circuit's earlier holding in Stephens v. Tielsch, 502 F.2d 1360
(9th Cir. 1974). See also Elterich v. City of Sea Isle, 477 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1973); Kao v.
Red Lion Mun. Auth., 381 F. Supp. 1163 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gigliotti v. Redevelopment Auth.,
362 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
146. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1971).
147. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183 (1961); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir.
1977).
148. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183; Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971);
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). For an argument advocating the necessity of
requiring exhaustion of state judicial remedies, see Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in
the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 .ARv. L. Rv. 1486 (1969).
149. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963). See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1968); Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in
Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974).
150. E.g., Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp. 429,
432-34 (D. Nev. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974); Steel Hill Dev. v. Town Sanbornton, 335
F. Supp. 947 (D.N.H. 1971).
151. E.g., Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 228 (D. Conn. 1974).
152. Sanfilippo v. County o1 Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D. Nev.
1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
153. See generally D. MANDELKER, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEvELOPMENT 281-83
(1979); Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Zoning Cases, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 368.
154. See, e.g., Purcell v. Krause, No. 78-C-4105 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1980) (total failure to
pursue state administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal). See generally Staples, supra
note 14, at 151-52.
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establishing that the relief available under state law would be inadequate and
should not be required to exhaust state administrative remedies.
MunicipalImmunity
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of
Social Services abolished the absolute immunity of municipalities from damage
suits under section 1983 which had resulted in the dismissal of many zoning
actions, but the opinion explicitly left open the extent and conditions of the
remaining municipal liability.1 5 After Monell, the federal circuit courts came
to different conclusions as to whether local governments enjoy any immunity
based on the good faith of their officials.:16 Two earlier federal circuit court
cases brought as Bivens actions illustrate different approaches to municipal
immunity in the enforcement of invalid zoning ordinances. Brault v. Town of
Milton' 57 involved landowners who were enjoined from using their land as a
trailer park under an invalid ordinance. Under a Vermont statute authorizing
damages for the wrongful issuance of an injunction,158 a judgment of $86,411
was awarded. The state supreme court nevertheless limited recovery to the $500
bond posted by the town, based on a state municipal immunity doctrine.159
Plaintiffs then brought an action in federal court asking for the same damages,
alleging deprivation of property without due process. In a rehearing en banc,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it did not allege malice.60 The court, while noting that
the complaint specifically stated that the town knew or should have known the
ordinance was invalid, based its malice standard on the common law malicious
prosecution requirement that the action result from a wrongful motive.161 On
similar facts, the Sixth Circuit came to a different conclusion. Gordon v. City
of Warren,6 2 like Brault, involved a landowner deprived of the use of his
property under an invalid ordinance. However, the complaint alleged an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation rather than a due
process violation. In reversing a summary judgment for the defendants, the
court noted the possibility of a qualified immunity for individual defendants,
with the dear implication that the municipality would be strictly liable for a
taking, even a temporary one. 68
155. 436 US. 658, 695-701 (1978). See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
156. Compare Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979) (county entitled to
good faith immunity) with Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (no qualified im.
munity).

157. 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975).
158. Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §4447 (1958).
159. Town of Milton v. Brault, 132 Vt. 377, 320 A.2d 630 (1974).
160. 527 F.2d at 739.
161. Id.
162. 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978).
163. Id. at 392. A New Jersey superior court adopted a similar standard in T & M
Homes v. Town of Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (Law Div. 1978), a §1983
zoning action brought in state court. After reviewing the Monell decision the court held that
the municipality would enjoy a qualified good faith immunity unless a taking were shown.

In that case, the municipality would be strictly liable since it would only be paying for what
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Future plaintiffs will not be concerned with the municipal immunity defense because of the Supreme Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence. 64 The Court held that local governments are now strictly liable under
section 1983 for injuries caused by constitutional violations. The plaintiff in
Owen, a municipal police chief, was fired after public allegations by city officials concerning improprieties in the operation of the police property room.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, 165 the public statements were determined to
have impugned the plaintiff's reputation and thereby deprived him of a protected liberty interest without due process. 166 The circuit court held, however,
that the city was protected by a good faith immunity. 167 Because the right to a
"name-clearing" hearing 68 was not established until after the plaintiff's discharge, the city could not have known of his right to such a hearing and therefore could not have acted with the requisite malice. 1-6 The Supreme Court
reversed, concluding after an examination of the common law basis of individual official immunities that no such traditional protection existed for
municipalities.', 0 The Court further found that the policy reasons for immunizing individual officials did not apply to the city' 71 and found no legislait had received. ld. at 515-16, 393 A.2d at 624. A federal case in which a temporary taking
under an invalid ordinance has been held to state a claim is Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township
of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 721 (D.N.J. 1976). Some state courts have rejected damage
liability for enforcement of an invalid ordinance. E.g., Veling v. Borough of Ramsey, 94 N.J.
Super. 459, 228 A.2d 873 (App. Div. 1967); Harvey v. Town of Waitsfield, 137 Vt. 80, 401 A.2d
900 (1979).
164. 100 S, Ct. 1389 (1980).
165. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977).
166. After the public allegations, but before his discharge, Chief Owen demanded written
notice of the charges against him and a public hearing with opportunity to respond to the
charges. This demand was ignored and no reasons were given for his termination. The city
also denied a request for an appeal of the decision. 100 S. Ct. at 1404.
167. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). The case was originally
brought as a direct action under the fourteenth amendment and the defendants petitioned the
Supreme Court for review after the initial circuit court decision. The Supreme Court remanded
for reconsideration in light of Monell's holding that the municipality could be sued under
section 1983. On remand the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Chief Owen's rights
had been violated but denied liability on the ground of good faith immunity. Thus, the
primary issue of the case was whether the city was entitled to such immunity.
168. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
169. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 338. The circuit court reasoned that the
city should not be responsible for predicting future developments in constitutional law. Id.
It should be noted, however, that a city would be responsible only for developments in the
law occurring between the occurrence from which the claim arises and final resolution of the
suit.
170. 100 S. Ct. at 1409-12. The Court noted that municipalities have traditionally been
treated as natural persons for purposes of statutory, constitutional and common law damage
claims with no good faith immunity. Id. at 1409-10.
171. The primary policy behind immunity for public officials is to shield them from
personal liability. 100 S. Ct. at 1409 n.18. This personal immunity prevents indecision and
inaction based on fear of personal liability, the idea being that it is "better to risk some error
and possible injury ... than not to decide or act at all." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242

(1974).
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tive intent to exclude municipalities from liability under section 1983.172 The
Supreme Court then applied a cost distribution approach to constitutional
injuries inflicted by local governments 7 3 and concluded that the government
should be strictly liable for those injuries regardless of whether the subsequent
development of that constitutional right could have been foreseen by the
acting officials.' 7'
Considering the embryonic state of constitutional guarantees in zoning,
especially as to procedural due process rights, this decision should have a great
impact on zoning litigation. As constitutional rights in zoning are clarified in
the expanding body of federal case law, damage awards will not be barred by
the municipality's good faith immunity even though the constitutional rights
vindicated were previously in question. Injured landowners will be encouraged
to seek redress by the knowledge that they can recover damages if a developing
constitutional right is established in their suits. 75 Thus, the elimination of
municipal immunity for constitutional violations should expedite and simplify
zoning damage suits under section 1983, as well as encourage the development
of a coherent body of constitutional law concerning procedural rights in zoning.
DAMAGES IN SECTION

1983 ACTION

Three general classes of damages may be sought in zoning suits under
section 1983: (1) damages representing the value of the property allegedly taken
by the zoning action; (2) consequential damages for losses caused by an invalid
zoning action; and (3) attorney's fees. The first class of damages available under
section 1983 has traditionally been the only monetary relief available in zoning
damage actions not under section 1983. Although commentators have proposed
numerous sophisticated models for the compensation of losses caused by zoning
actions, 17 6 when plaintiffs in federal courts have established an unconstitutional
taking, just compensation is generally equal to the difference in the fair market
172. 100 S. Ct. at 1410.
173. Id. at 1413. The Supreme Court stated that since the people reap the benefits of a
government action, it is equitable to spread the cost of the government's mistakes among the
entire citizenry rather than forcing the injured individual to bear the entire cost.
174. Id. at 1412.
175. Under a qualified immunity standard, a plaintiff could establish a flagrant constitutional violation with serious personal and financial consequences and yet be denied recovery on the ground that the constitutional right violated was not known to the municipality
at the time of the occurrence. See Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir.

1978).
176. See, e.g., Ervin & Fitch, Evaluating Alternate Compensation Techniques for Expanded Public Control of Land Use, 19 NAT. REsoURcEs J. 21 (1979) (examining transfers of
development rights, zoning actions and zoning by eminent domain); Developments in the
Law-Zoning, supra note 43, at 1497-1501; Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for
Diminution in Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1976). In general, these theories deal with validly enacted zoning measures and seek to avoid the taking
issue by statutory compensation while expanding the scope of permissible regulation. Even
with such alternatives to traditional zoning procedures, the Constitution remains a basic
limitation on the state's zoning power. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438

U.S. 104 (1978).
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value of the property before and after the imposition of the regulation. 177 In
zoning cases where the plaintiff must establish that the regulation renders the
property substantially worthless, 7 8 this difference will be the entire value of the
property. 7 9 When an ordinance deprives a landowner of all use of his property
for a limited period either by a building moratorium"1 0 or the enforcement of
an ordinance later found to be invalid,' s 1 damages for the taking will be measured by the fair rental value of the property. 82 This limited measure of
damages in pre-section 1983 causes of action, which does not include consequential losses such as vandalism or increased construction costs, 8 3 evolved in
eminent domain cases where a valid government purpose compelled the temporary taking,18 4 and is based only on the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment.
In contrast, suits under section 1983 have a specific statutory basis for the
award of damages. 15 Section 1983 suits for violations of other constitutional
rights have firmly established the right to recovery of consequential and punitive damages. 86 Consequential damages are of particular importance when the
enforcement of a procedurally or substantively invalid ordinance has resulted
in the loss of the use of property for the time required to invalidate the regulation.18 7 While there are few reported cases on this issue, in zoning disputes
where plaintiffs have suffered reasonably ascertainable consequential losses
from an unconstitutional temporary taking, section 1983 should provide a more
177. United States v. Virginia Power & Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Jensen v.
United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. CL. 1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 319, 391
P.2d 540, 547 (1964) (inverse condemnation measure is diminution in value).
178. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text, supra.
179. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470-74 (1973)
(owner entitled to fair market value of property at time of taking).
180. See, e.g., Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968)
(one year freeze on development of property required compensation).
181. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 387 (6th Cir. 1978) (four year loss
of property through enforcement of invalid ordinance); Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d
730, 732 (1975) (injunction enforcing ordinance enacted with defective notice caused loss of
property for four years); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 713
(D.N.J. 1976).
182. Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728-29 (D.N.J. 1978);
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. 1978).
183. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1978).
184. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945); R.J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988,
994 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (in absence of statute compensation awarded only for property, not consequential losses).
185. See note 20 supra.
186. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (punitive damages
available without actual damages); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1979)
(punitii'e damages in addition to compensatory damages based on future earnings); Gusman v.
Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1976) (out of pocket expenses plus
emotional distress); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.)
(damages for violation of intangible right awarded without reference to objective standard),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978); Brault v. Town of
Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975).
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flexible remedy, allowing the recovery of increased construction and financing
costs, vandalism losses and possibly lost profits.18s Lost profits are unlikely to be
awarded where the developer's project is still in the planning stages or where
189
damages would represent rental on undeveloped land. Where an existing
1 90
business is affected, however, lost profits should be certain enough to allow
recovery. A more difficult case would be presented where substantial construction had begun and the developer claimed lost profits or rentals from prospective occupants. 91 Although punitive damages can also be awarded under
section 1983,192 a showing of willful and malicious conduct, which is difficult
to establish in zoning actions, is required.19s
A further advantage of a section 1983 damage suit is that the prevailing
party may be awarded attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.'10 Although the award is discretionary, that discretion is
limited and the prevailing party should ordinarily recover attorney's fees in
the absence of special circumstances. 9 5
188. In other, non-zoning actions, the courts have awarded damages for those intangible
losses which were amenable to measurement and proof. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
556 (1927) (loss of voting rights held to be compensable); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, 496 F.2d
1119 (7th Cir. 1974) (abridgment of housing opportunity); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1965) (illegal arrests). Examples of losses which could be easily established are changes in
the price of materials and labor and increased interest rates. Due to the recency of the availability of §1983 in zoning actions against municipalities, few xeported damage awards are
available. Nonetheless, plaintiffs in Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1978),
have been granted summary judgment on liability for such damages and are preparing for a
hearing on amount of damages. Interview with Timothy A. Fusco, attorney for plaintiffs in
Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978), by phone (April 15, 1980). See also
Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1976) (consequential damages
for unconstitutional denial of sand extraction permit).
189. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1978) (no damages for loss
of use of undeveloped property having no rental value). The Texas state courts have recognized the overlap between police power regulation and eminent domain more explicitly than
any other courts. See San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 273-74 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (distinction between police power regulation and eminent domain is illusory
in case of taking by regulation).
190. See, e.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975) (use of land as trailer
park enjoined under invalid ordinance).
191. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978) (partially completed apartment building); Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 790, 553 P.2d 546, 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586, 389 (1976) (substantial
expenditure on unfinished housing development).
192. See note 186 supra.
193. See, e.g., Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1976); Wright
v. Owen, 468 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 (D. Mo. 1979).
194. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976), provides in
pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1985, and
1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-518, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on
behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of
the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
195. Newman v. Pigge Park Enterprise, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (special circumstances required for denial of attorney's fees); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897
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CONCLUSION

As local governments become more concerned about the effects of development on their communities, developers are increasingly likely to incur financial
injury as a result of invalid zoning actions. Relief under traditional state law
remedies and state inverse condemnation actions is uncertain and, in cases involving consequential damages, inadequate. Federal actions under section 1983
provide a supplementary remedy capable of providing full recovery of damages
when certain threshold problems are overcome. Many federal courts seeking
to avoid sensitive local matters are likely to abstain from considering these
claims, especially if an unresolved question of state law or a comprehensive
state land use plan is involved. While plaintiffs alleging an uncompensated
taking appear most likely to succeed in establishing violations of their civil
rights, procedural defects in an otherwise valid ordinance are increasingly
likely to provide a successful basis for litigation. Such claims will depend on
whether the property interest involved is viewed by the court as constitutionally
protected and whether the zoning proceeding is found to be quasi-judicial in
nature. Thus, plaintiffs able to establish that they have been deprived of a
vested property interest in a procedurally defective action which regulates only
their property have the best chance of recovery. If the zoning action is viewed as
legislative, plaintiffs will have to show a taking or that the regulation is arbitrary and capricious. Despite these limitations, damage actions under section
1983 provide an increasingly effective remedy for constitutional violations in
zoning which result in losses not compensable under state law.
(9th Cir. 1979) (denial of award was abuse of discretion when no special circumstances were
present); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).
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